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 Abstract  
One of the limitations of cross-country health expenditure analysis refers to the fact that the 
financing, the internal organization and political restraints of health care decision-making are 
country-specific and heterogeneous. Yet, a potential solution is to examine the influence of 
such effects in those countries that have undertaken decentralization processes. In such a 
setting, it is possible to examine potential expenditure spillovers across the geography of a 
country as well as the influence of the political ideology of regional incumbents on public 
health expenditure. This paper examines the determinants of public health expenditure within 
Spanish region-states (Autonomous Communities, ACs), most of them subject to similar 
financing structures although exhibiting significant heterogeneity as a result of the increasing 
decentralization, region-specific political factors along with different use of health care inputs, 
economic dimension and spatial interactions.   
 
Keywords: health expenditure, devolution, political ideology, political competition and spatial 
interactions. 
JEL Classification: I18, I38, H73 
 
Resum 
Una de les limitacions de l’anàlisi de la despesa sanitària entre diferents països és el fet que el 
finançament, l’organització interna i les restriccions de decisió politíques són específiques de 
cada país. Una forma de solucionar el problema consisteix en limitar l’anàlisi a un país que 
hagi descentralitzat l’organització del sistema sanitari.  En aquest cas també és possible 
examinar l’existència d’externalitats de despesa sanitària derivades d’interaccions 
estratègiques, així com la influència de la ideologia sobre la despesa sanitària pública.  Aquest 
article examina els determinants de la despesa sanitària a les comunitats autònomes (CCAA) 
de l’Estat Espanyol, les quals presenten una certa heterogeneïtat derivada dels diferents graus 
de descentralizació, dels efectes polítics específics, així com diferències en la utilització de 
serveis, dimensió econòmica i interaccions espacials.  
  
Paraules claus: despesa sanitària, ideologia política, competència política i interaccions 
espacials  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The growth of public health expenditure is at the forefront of the health 
policy debates in most Western economies. After the seminal paper by 
Newhouse (1977), the examination of the determinants of health care 
expenditure has been a matter of extensive debate over the last two decades. The 
progressively large availability of international data on health care has led to the 
development of a vast array of studies disentangling the underlying factors that 
determine health care expenditure, such as income, aging, time effects and 
availability of factors. Another factor examined is that of technology progress 
(Newhouse, 1992). However, most studies are based on cross-country data to 
disentangle the extent to which income – measured by gross domestic product 
(GDP) – and other determinants, such as demographics and heterogeneity of 
health care inputs, explain differences in health expenditure.  
 
In the light of the long-lasting studies on whether health care is a luxury 
good, as pointed out by Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998), restricting the analysis 
to single countries with multiple jurisdictions providing health care might, to an 
extent, reduce part of the existing heterogeneity on health care expenditure 
across countries attributable to differences in the extent of health converge and 
internal design. Similarly, Gionannoni and Hittris (2002) attempt to examine the 
determinants of regional health expenditures in Italy and find significant 
regional specific effects.  Both studies use jurisdiction-level data and account for 
demographic and health care system determinants of public health expenditure. 
However, they do not examine the extent to which public expenditure in one 
jurisdiction is affected by the expenditure spillovers from neighbouring 
jurisdictions; although both theoretical and empirical studies suggest that the 
hypothesis of spatial interactions may not be ruled out (Revelli, 2002, 2001). 
Indeed, expenditure in one jurisdiction can provide beneficial or harmful effects 
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over residents in other jurisdictions (Gordon, 1983). On the other hand, prior 
studies do not account for political characteristics, which arguably stand at the 
forefront of the health care decision-making in countries where the mainstream 
health insurer is the public sector. Besley and Case (1995) provide an 
explanation on the basis of political agency where constituents and politicians 
respond to events in other jurisdictions. 
 
The decentralization process that has taken place in Spain stands as a 
clear-cut example with which to examine these issues. Indeed, given that the 
system is mainly politically rather than fiscally decentralized, very few 
differences will come up in the funding of the system as regards regional health 
systems mainly funded by a single central authority (with the exception of two 
ACs that enjoy fiscal in addition to political responsibilities). On the other hand, 
it is possible to examine whether demographic and other specific regional 
characteristics affect health care expenditure, or issues on whether regional size 
determines the existence of economies of scale in the provision of health care. 
Along with examining the influence of regional income in explaining health care 
expenditure, other determinants such as availability of inputs (e.g., number of 
health care professionals and beds) are expected to place some influence on 
expanding health care expenditure consistently with prior research. 
 
In the context of the European Union several studies have examined those 
effects (Hitris, 1997; Hitris and Nixon, 1997).  However, only limited evidence 
has been reported on the effect of such determinants within region-states, 
namely Di Matteo in the context of Canada and Giannoni and Hitris (2002) in 
the Italian context.  The former stresses the potentially negative effects of the 
split of health responsibilities into different regions, despite the specific effects 
of decentralization. However, the paper does not examine potential regional 
interactions in health care, although it acknowledges that differences in health 
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care expenditures could result from differences in the political ranking of health 
care among regions. Indeed, decentralization structures could give rise to 
‘competitive’ mechanisms that explain the patterns of health care expenditure. 
Thus, it is important in dealing with regional-specific data to check for potential 
spatial dependency that might be important in heterogeneous countries, as is the 
case of Spain. 
 
In most western health systems, the public sector is, with varying degrees, 
the mainstream health care financing body, and accordingly the association 
between health expenditure and income can be envisaged as being more a 
reflection of the Wagner Law (Lybeck, 1988, Kananvos and Mossialos, 1999), 
than of specific market behavioural mechanisms. Public sector behaviour is 
arguably influenced by the specific institutional design of the health system. One 
of the most frequently cited institutional features is the degree to which the 
political system is centralized (Pommerehne, 1990). On the other hand, Meltzer 
and Richard (1983) argue that the expansion of democratic participation brings 
greater pressure on governments to expand the size of the public sector in so far 
as it shifts the identity of the decisive or median voter further toward a position 
of strong support for government redistributive efforts. Accordingly, if the 
ultimate decision-makers are political incumbents with differing ideologies, we 
should expect according to the standard partisan ideology (Wittman, 1983) that 
parties of the left would favour a large and active state, particularly one 
committed to egalitarian forms of redistribution. Furthermore, if political parties 
are assumed to be agents of their constituents, the incumbents’ political ideology 
might be thought of as representing that of the median voter in a specific 
constituency. Indeed, a factor that has been treated extensively in the literature 
on public sector growth is the ideology of the party in government and in 
general the composition of the parliament that is supposed to vote on health care 
issues. However, there is some evidence that does not confirm the role of 
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ideology in increasing expenditure, but stresses the potential credibility effects 
of left-wing governments in cutting public expenditure (Tavares, 1994). 
 
Spain expend about 7.6% of GDP on health care, and about 5.6% of GDP 
on public health care in 2001, which implies that the public sector funds about 
75% of total health expenditure. Two major features have defined health care 
reform in Spain. On the one hand, the consolidation of the National Health 
System (NHS), which has remained largely politicized (Lopez-Casanovas et al, 
2005). On the other hand, the setting up of a gradual process of health care 
decentralization from the early eighties, whereby an increasing number of 
region-states (so-called Comunidades Autonomas, henceforth ACs) have taken 
over health care responsibilities. However, the specific sort of health care 
decentralization taking place in Spain falls mainly in the political arena, in so far 
as the main power to raise taxes (with the exception of minor taxes, e.g. petrol 
tax discharges) is in the hands of the central state with the exception of two ACs 
that are entitled to raise general taxes (Basque Country and Navarre). 
 
Previous research has focused on understanding the political process 
(Rico and Costa-Font, 2005) and evaluating the system in itself (Lopez-
Casanovas et al, 2005). However, little is known on the determinants of public 
expenditure on health care at the regional level and the extent to which regional 
interactions explain the expansion of health care expenditure. Two thirds of 
public health care expenditure has been decentralized to the ACs during 1992-
1999 and health care has accounted for about 40% of AC public expenditure. 
Accordingly, the Spanish example offers some interesting questions for a broad 
research audience. Decentralization is arguably increasing the efficiency of 
health care provision as a result of reliance on regional specific knowledge, 
needs and preferences rather than focusing on national and uniform health care 
provision. However, limited research has been conducted in showing the 
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potential effects of decentralization, together with other determinants in the 
generation of health care expenditures. The first question that the developments 
of the Spanish health system poses to the debate on decentralization and health 
expenditure is whether decentralization can potentially increase the efficiency of 
the health system. In particular, whether the mechanisms of vertical and 
horizontal competition between regional health systems take place in Spain. In 
countries where multiple jurisdictions provide health care, one might expect 
some strategic interaction-taking place among regions, which arguably might 
influence the way health care expenditure is determined. Given the structure of 
Spain’s political system, we are able to test whether government size in health 
care is determined by political ideology of the incumbent parties running the 
health system at the AC level and at the central levels for those ACs that were 
centrally ruled.    
 
This paper aims to examine the determinants of public health care 
expenditure and in particular the influence of regional income, potential spatial 
dependency, political ideology along with availability of inputs and demand 
influences, such as inflation, aging and unemployment. A response to these 
factors might be important in finding a response to the potential impact of the 
design of decentralization structures in determining the design of the health care 
system. On the other hand, given that NHS expenditure results from political 
priorities, potential evidence on the influence of such priorities in driving 
expenditure might be a key issue in understanding the potential patterns of 
expenditure. Finally, the role of health inputs and income is key in examining 
whether health care policies have an influence on cutting expenditure.  
 
The structure of this paper is the following. Next, we undertake a revision 
of the previous literature on health care determinants. Section three is devoted to 
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the institutional setting. Section four describes the data and methods and section 
five reports the results. Finally, the paper ends with a conclusion.  
 
2.   HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURE DETERMINANTS  
 
2.1 Evidence of expenditure determinants  
 
One of the issues, which have captured most of the debate, is whether 
health care is a luxury good. Okunade and Murthy (2002) find that together with 
income it exhibits a stable relationship with health care expenditure per capita.   
This issue is intriguing due to the potential implications for redistribution. 
Interestingly, there is no agreement in the literature. On the one hand, Getzen 
(2000) argues that while evidences point out that health care is a luxury good at 
the individual level, it is a necessary good. Clemente et al (2004) point out that 
the inconsistency of this result with that of previous literature lies in the 
‘aggregation problem’, and therefore by separating public from private health 
expenditure it is possible to respond to this issue. They find a heterogeneous 
pattern, as both types of expenditure are significantly different. Furthermore, as 
noted by Culyer (1998), one would expect health care to be less dependent on 
the ability to pay in those countries where health care is heavily subsidized.  
 
2.2 Methodological issues 
 
In dealing with international health care expenditure functions, 
availability of international data has fostered the development of a significant 
amount of empirical work. However, heterogeneously regulated, financed and 
managed health systems are pooled together, which arguably might limit the 
comparability. Indeed, among OECD countries there are sizeable differences in 
the health care package. Accordingly, it is doubtful that data from different 
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countries in fact measure the same, which is the ‘heterogeneity problem’ 
(Getzen, 2000).  On the other hand, by examining a large period of time, there 
might be a ‘stability problem’ (Jewell et al, 2003; Clemente et al, 2004). 
 
Significant methodological issues have led to a questioning of the validity 
of these results (Clemente et al, 2004; McCoskey and Selden, 1998; Hansen and 
King 1996; Blomqvist and Carter, 1997; Karatzas, 2000; Roberts, 2000). To this 
end, some studies deal with specific methodological issues underlying the 
determination of the health care expenditure function, and in particular they 
account for the potential non-stationary of the data, although there is no 
agreement on whether the data are cointegrated (Gerdthan and Lothgren, 2000, 
Clemente et al, 2004). The application of panel data methods allows for 
potential differences in tastes and preferences in the health care expenditure 
function. Some previous evidence (Hitris and Possnett, 1992) uses time series 
cross-section analysis and Di Matteo and Di Matteo (1998) employ panel data 
techniques to examine health care expenditure determinants. However, no 
spatial interactions are considered. Interestingly, not accounting for spatial 
dependence has been shown to lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of the 
parameters of an equation of public expenditure determination (Case et al, 1993, 
Revelli, 2002).  The existence of some spatial dependence might invalidate 
some of the existing conclusions. Some studies identify causality problems in 
examining health expenditure and GDP, which apply in the Spanish case 
(Devlin and Hansen, 2001). In addition to causality, the set up of an 
economically integrated area has led to studies on whether there is a singe health 
care function. 
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2.3 Inter –governmental competition and spatial interactions 
 
The examination of public expenditure in settings where several 
jurisdictions are entitled to provide health care to their population, in addition to 
certain economic, political and demographic characteristics, demonstrate that the 
level of public expenditure might be affected by expenditures of neighbouring 
jurisdictions due to exposure to ‘common shocks’ (e.g. an epidemic associated 
with a geographical area) or what is genuinely defined as ‘policy 
interdependence’ (Case et al, 1993).  Indeed, strategic interaction might take 
place among regional governments on setting their taxes and expenditures so 
that some welfare competition has been suggested to take place (Sinn, 2003). 
Citizens of one jurisdiction might look at neighbouring jurisdictions’ benefits 
levels in judging their own jurisdiction performance. Accordingly, incumbents 
at the regional level might react to this effect by both reducing taxes and benefits 
(health care coverage) if they are fiscally accountable governments and the other 
way round if they are not. On the other hand, equilibrium might take place 
through the so-called ‘welfare migration’ (Brueckner, 2000). Under welfare 
migration, welfare ‘generosity’ leads to tax increases in more generous regions 
to fund new recipients of welfare. However, when welfare migration is limited – 
as is the case in Spain (less that 1% of patients are treated in hospitals of 
different AC) and most European countries -, then a separate equilibrium can 
take place while regional incumbents might have incentives to increase 
coverage.  When coordination by the central state is weak, there are incentives 
for regional incumbents to compete with the central state (Breton, 1996). The 
latter is catalogued as vertical competition and takes place together with 
yardstick competition mechanisms whereby political accountability allows 
constituents in one region to benchmark their demand on the basis of other 
regions’ performance (Besley and Case, 1985; Costa-Font and Rico, 2005).  
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In the Spanish NHS, incentives are not to reduce taxes, in so far as taxes 
are uniformly defined with the exception of two ACs, but to increase 
expenditure. This might potentially take place in the political arena, whereby 
regional and national incumbents might not be willing to cut expenditure in 
certain areas, and welfare benefits in one region are likely to exhibit a so–called 
“race to the top” rather than a race to the bottom (Costa and Rico, 2005). If this 
is the case, we should expect some strategic interaction whereby welfare 
coverage of some ACs is likely to depend on the coverage of neighbouring 
regions.  
 
2.4 Political competition 
 
Several studies report evidence supporting these so-called Partisan cycles 
as influencing public expenditure (Cameron, 1978, Roubini and Sachs, 1989 and 
Haan and Sturm, 1994), although some scholars suggest that this feature should 
distinguish between the types of public expenditure, whereby parties of the left 
may favour spending of a social welfare character (Henrekson, 1988). Other 
partisan-related features have also been shown to be relevant, such as the kind of 
government, e.g. coalition vs majority governments’ in so far as large coalition 
and minority governments may have more difficulties in reaching agreement to 
balance the budget (Haan and Sturm, 1997). Interestingly, some recent evidence 
(Tavares, 2004) indicates that the left gains credibility in cutting expenditure 
while the right gains credibility when it increases tax revenues. Therefore, the 
role of political competition and ideology seems to be far from evident in 
undertaking fiscal policies affecting health expenditure.  Indeed, national 
politics (and public choice) are potentially shifting public health care 
expenditure (Parkin et al, 1987), although no evidence has yet been reported. In 
Spain, in the 1990s there was increasing dynamism in the political system both 
at the central level (two socialist and two conservative governments) and at the 
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AC level. Furthermore, some regions are ruled during the period examined by 
peripheral nationalists that arguably exhibit demand for higher self-government 
(e.g. Catalonia and the Basque Country).  
 
 
3. THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
 
The NHS in Spain is financed by funds raised through general taxation 
with minor user co-payments for drugs and minor procedures. The population 
has the right to free access to services and benefits are comprehensive, even 
though coverage is minimal for preventive programmes, long-term care and 
dental services, albeit with some regional diversity.1 Health care, together with 
education, ranks first in the responsibilities of region-states and is the first 
government priority of citizens. This feature might explain the degree of 
politicization of the system. 
 
The Spanish NHS has followed until 2002 a model of asymmetric 
federalism where health care accounts for about 40 per cent of regional 
expenditure. Two thirds of the Spanish population received health care from 
their own region-states — legally named as autonomous communities (ACs).2 
The ACs were responsible for health care planning, organization and 
management, and thus are politically accountable to their constituents as regards 
                                                 
1  While the Basque Country and Andalusia cover child dental care, other regions do not. 
Similarly, whereas long-term care is defined as a public responsibility in some regional basic 
statutory Law (e.g., Castille-La Mancha), in some other regions it is defined as an individual 
responsibility (e.g. Catalonia). 
2  The reasons for setting up a model of asymmetric federalism lie in the pre-existing 
differences in the management capacity of some ACs as opposed to newly created ones as 
well as supply side dissimilarities. For example, the Catalan health care structure relies 
mainly on private non profit-making private organizations. 
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health expenditure.3 Regional parliaments in the seven ACs that were 
empowered with health care responsibilities enjoyed large legislative capacity 
only limited by basic legislation of the central state, although in practice given 
the evidence of vertical competition this did not operate as a tight constraint 
(Costa-Font and Rico, 2005). Health care in the remaining ten ACs remained 
centrally managed by the National Institute of Health (Instituto Nacional de la 
Salud, INSALUD) and regional governments in those regions only had some 
restricted powers in the fields of primary and community care.4 The transfer of 
health responsibilities to Catalonia was completed in 1981, followed by 
Andalusia (1984), the Basque Country and Valencia (1988), Galicia and Navarre 
(1991), the Canary Islands (1994), and from 2002, the remaining ACs were 
empowered with health care responsibilities. 
 
Funds are centrally collected and allocated to ACs under a single central 
transfer following the lines of a block grant in accordance with an unadjusted 
capitation formula, with the exception of Navarre and the Basque Country – 
which are entitled to do so themselves. Some fiscal capacity exists for minor 
taxes and tax surcharges in the remaining ACs and though fiscal regional 
responsibility has been progressively increasing - by transferring an increasing 
percentage up to 30% of revenues plus a 20% surcharge on the personal income 
tax –the ‘vicious cycle’ of overspending (prevalent as normal practice both 
before and after the devolution process) has persisted (Lopez Casanovas et al, 
2005). Previous evidence on the evolution of health care expenditure using 
decomposition analysis of health care expenditure data suggests that after the 
1990s when the decentralization process was deepened by transferring health 
                                                 
3  With the exception of some sanitation functions, which are carried out by local health 
authorities, most other public health and health promotion activities were transferred to the 
regions during the 1980s. 
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care responsibilities to five ACs, volume was the main determinant of health 
care expenditure rather than prices (Lopez-Casasnovas et al, 2005).  
 
4. THE DATA AND METHODS 
 
4.1 The data 
 
We have collected data on public health care expenditure from the 
Ministry of Health and Consumption, 2003 (Cuentas Satélites del Sistema 
Sanitario, 1992-1999) as well as complimentary statistical information at the 
regional level (GDP, population and inflation rates) from a specific tool 
published by the (Spanish) National Institute of Statistics (INE) containing 
desegregated data at the AC level (Contabilidad Regional de España). 
Information on health care inputs and in particular the number of doctors and 
beds at the AC level has been gathered from the INE database for several years. 
Data on electoral results has been collected from Eleweb5, a web page of 
Spanish political scientists that contains a collection of updated information on 
electoral results for different electoral calls in Spain. We have collected data 
from all Spanish regions from 1992-1998 given that this is the period where the 
largest decentralization move took place. As aforementioned, the devolution 
process was asymmetrically developed. Indeed, while 7 ACs were empowered 
with health care responsibilities, the MoH, through a specific agency called 
INSALUD, centrally ruled the remaining 10 ACs.  Therefore, given the 
information on the specific characteristics of different ACs and the extent to 
which each AC has been empowered with health care responsibilities, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 For certain common decisions, it draws on the input of the Inter-territorial Council of the 
NHS — an advisory committee comprising representatives from the central and regional 
governments — where coordination should legally take place. 
5 http://www.eleweb.net/eleccionsespanya/autonomiques/ (consulted December 2004). 
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database contains a set of dummy variables for regionally specific institutional 
arrangements.  
 
4.2 The empirical model 
 
A standard empirical model for public health expenditure determination is 
usually expressed in a linear specification, as follows:   
 
                                            ititit XH μβ +=                                                 (1) 
  
where the vector of public health care expenditure per capita for each AC 
(in real terms) is defined by  ,  is a matrix of explanatory 
variables,
itH itX )(NxK
β  is a vector of parameters and itμ  is an identical and independently 
distributed  error term. Yet, the above model might suffer from spatial 
autocorrelation and therefore might not be correctly specified, given that 
spatially autocorrelated variables are likely to exert some influence over  in 
decentralized NHS models
itH
6. Reasons for spatial dependence in health care 
expenditures might be the existence of differences in preferences for health care 
or heterogeneity in needs. On the other hand, there might be common effects 
from central governmental policies which can be modelled by specifying a 
spatial process in the error term of the public health expenditure equation as 
follows: 
 
                                       ξμλμ += Wit                                                       (2) 
 
                                                 
6 Spatial autocorrelation might adopt two different forms (see Anselin and Florax, 1995 and Anselin et al., 2004 
for a detailed description). On the one hand, in autoregressive spatial models, some structural dependence exists 
between the value of the endogenous variable in an area and the values taken by this variable in other 
neighbouring areas. On the other hand, in models of autoregressive spatial error disturbances, the spatial 
dependence is included in the term error. 
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where 1<λ  is a spatial scalar measuring spatial dependence, W is a 
spatially standardized matrix (contract’s matrix) containing observation location 
information so that the row sums one and ξ is an error term identically and 
independently distributed over space. On the other hand, public health 
expenditure might be influenced by spatial interdependence, so that each 
jurisdiction’s health expenditure decision might be affected by their neighbours’ 
health expenditures, which could be written as: 
 
                              ζβρ ++= ititit XWHH                                               (3) 
 
where 1<ρ  is a coefficient diagnosing the existence of spatial 
dependence, so that each public health expenditure observation is 
simultaneously determined with health expenditures of neighbouring 
jurisdictions through spatial weights W. Thus, in the presence of spatial 
dependence, OLS estimates will be unbiased but inefficient, and hence the 
inference based on the individual parameter’s significance tests will be biased 
and potentially invalid if omitted from the model in so far as some spatial 
dependence will remain in the residuals (Revelli, 2001). 
 
Our empirical strategy has been to estimate the basic functional form 
proposed by OLS with fixed effects and to test whether there is evidence of 
spatial autocorrelation, either at the level of the endogenous variable or at the 
residual level. Following the traditional approach, we have computed the Moran 
I test and the tests based on the Lagrange multipliers principle, LM-LAG and 
LM-ERR (Anselin and Florax, 1995). The Moran I contrast is a general test that 
measures the similarity between the correlation in value and space of public 
health expenditure in this context. However, it provides no additional 
information about the spatial process form. To investigate this issue in detail, we 
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employ the robust Lagrange multiplier test for ‘spatial lag dependence’ (LM-
LAG) and the robust Lagrange multiplier test for ‘spatial error dependence’ 
(LM-ERR), which allow us, in the case of spatial dependence, to discriminate 
between the two forms that this dependence can adopt. As noted before, we first 
need to define a contact’s matrix (W), which captures potential interactions or 
spatial dependence between the different regions. We used a contact’s matrix 
based on the inverse of the squared distance between each region-state capital. 
The only restriction in using these tests refers to the fact that these two contrasts 
assume a normal distribution in the errors of the models estimated by OLS. To 
examine the normality hypothesis, we employ the Kiefer and Salom test that 
leads us to accept the assumption of normality of the residuals. On the other 
hand, in the estimated models, we calculated the Breusch and Pagan test and 
could not reject the null hypothesis of the sample’s homoscedasticity in either 
case. Finally, the model is estimated using a log-log form in so far as then the 
coefficient can be interpreted as elasticity.  
 
4.3 The variables 
 
On the basis of prior studies, our empirical model includes information on 
per capita GDP of each AC and population, demographics as well as relative use 
of inputs, such as number of doctors and beds, and stays per population. FORAL 
is a dummy variable for those fiscally accountable ACs, GDIR is a dummy 
variable for those ACs that have health care responsibilities and POLI1 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the regional and the national 
incumbent are members of the same party. POLI2 refers to the share of left-wing 
MPs within each regional parliament7
                                                 
7 Left-wing parties in Spanish regions in this period refer to the socialist party (PSOE) and the coalition of 
ecosocialists and former communist party (IU). Alternative specifications, such as an interaction between 
decentralized responsibilities and political ideology of regional parliaments, was considered in the first instance 
but was never significant at the 5% level.  
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 We expect income to have a positive coefficient consistently with the 
previous literature. Aging is a more controversial issue, in so far as on the one 
hand it might be an indicator of need (higher demand for health care), although 
some evidence questions whether aging leads to higher health expenditures. A 
larger availability of inputs should be expected to raise health care expenditure, 
although dependent on the efficiency of its use. Fiscally accountable regions, in 
the context of health care being a higher priority for citizens, should be expected 
to display a positive coefficient. The ideology of the regional and/or national 
incumbent is expected to follow the traditional left wing and right-wing effects 
on public expenditure-specific signs.  
 
Previous descriptive analysis indicates significant heterogeneity in health 
care expenditure pre capita. Interestingly, those regions that are classified as 
fiscally accountable (the Basque Country and Navarre) exhibit higher health 
care expenditure per capita. Table 1 summarizes the main expenditure patterns 
among ACs, with and without health care responsibilities. Interestingly, simple 
descriptive analysis indicates that the two regions with fiscal responsibilities 
exhibit a higher expenditure per capita and that regions with a larger GDP are 
more likely to exhibit higher public health care expenditure.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Table 2 reports the evolution of the variables examined in the model. 
Amongst those variables, per capita health expenditure exhibits an increasing 
pattern consistent with the fact that Spain is experiencing an increasing income 
per capita as well as a rising pattern of physician’s density. Furthermore, during 
the period analysed we find an increasing number of regions governments ruled 
by the same party as the one ruling the central government. Finally, table 2 
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exhibits that the share of the elderly roughly increases over the period examined 
consistently with the aging process of the Spanish population and the number of 
hospital stays has remained almost constant.  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
In explaining our results we distinguish different objectives of our paper, 
so that the results can be discussed in the light of previous literature. The results 
obtained are shown in Table 3 and we summarize them in this section as 
responding to the different specific issues we posed in the paper objectives. Odd 
columns refer to OLS estimates (provided for comparative purposes) and even 
columns refer to ML estimates of serial error dependence (SER). All the models 
estimated exhibit similarly high explanatory power and the number of 
observations is 119 (7x17).   
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
 
5.1 Spatial dependence and decentralization 
 
Table 3 reports the results of different specifications of the public health 
expenditure determination. Interestingly, in all the different specifications we 
find that the Moran statistic points towards some form of spatial autocorrelation, 
but it is unable to discriminate between the aforementioned spatial lag and the 
spatial error dependence. In all the model’s specifications in Table 3 we reject 
the null hypothesis of absence of spatial dependence. The results obtained 
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suggest that the spatial dependence is included in the error term and so we re-
estimated the model with autoregressive spatial disturbances using the Lagrange 
multipliers methods (ML-SER). The results obtained using the two estimation 
methods (OLS and ML-SER) are similar, and the conclusions we can derive 
from the analysis of estimated parameters’ values and signs are the same. 
However, the non-inclusion of spatial dependence in the model estimation could 
have affected the inference realized and the validity of the specification tests 
performed. In addition, the Akaike (AIC) statistic indicates that it is better to use 
the model with spatial dependence. Thus, there is evidence of spatial 
dependence among regional health systems in Spain. In NHS systems, which 
have undertaken decentralization processes, we expect that the mechanisms of 
inter-governmental competition would take place.  The estimates of the spatial 
error dependence in Table 3 (λ ) yield a large and significant estimate. This 
coefficient indicates that there is a dependence between the decisions taken by 
the different Autonomous Communities within the sphere of health expenditure 
per inhabitant.  
 
Consistently with prior evidence, we find that regions that have 
decentralized health care are more likely to exhibit higher health care 
expenditure per capita (Lopez-Casasnovas et al, 2005). GDIR exhibits, as 
expected, positive and significant signs, indicating evidence of the influence of 
decentralized responsibilities on increasing health care expenditure. This result 
is consistent with Costa and Rico (2005), whereby vertical competition among 
ACs results in legitimate and politically accountable regions that are likely to 
increase the amount of health care expenditure. Indeed, political accountability 
determines power that leads to policy innovation rather than path dependency, 
which translates into higher health care expenditure .On the other hand, a similar 
effect is identified when FORAL is included in the equation: regions that were 
empowered with fiscal responsibilities exhibit higher public health expenditure. 
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This result indicates a reversion of the Leviathan hypothesis (Brenan and 
Buchanan, 1983). In a setting where health care stands as a main priority of 
constituents, as well as one of the few responsibilities in the hands of regional 
jurisdictions, one might expect that the mechanisms of the political agency 
would lead to an expansion of health care expenditure.  
 
5.2 Is Public health care a luxury good? 
 
Our results in Table 3 suggest that unambiguously income elasticities are 
lower than one in contrast with most studies using aggregate cross-country 
evidence.    Regardless of the specification, we systematically find that public 
health care expenditure is not a luxury good. Income elasticity estimates lie 
between 0.98 and 0.66, depending on the model specification, and the 
coefficients are slightly lower when the model controls for spatial dependence. 
Therefore, by specifically examining health care as funded by the public sector, 
we find that on the basis of income elasticity, it is a ‘necessity’ rather than a 
luxury good. This evidence is in line with some previous research (Di Mateo and 
Di Matteo, 1998) and indicates that in examining health care expenditure 
significant differences emerge when expenditure is decomposed between public 
and private. Public expenditure might be politically driven, and in countries that 
structure their health care system along the lines of an NHS system, public 
health insurance is the mainstream funder and offers health care coverage 
irrespective of individuals’ income.  However, the positive and significant sign 
of the coefficient for GDP might be capturing some evidence of the Wagner law, 
according to which public expenditure expands with economic development.  
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5.3 Does ideology and political competition matter? 
  
In NHS countries, the public sector is the mainstream financer of health 
care.  Accordingly, differences in the composition of regional governments are 
likely to influence the priority of health care as compared to other sources of 
health expenditure.  Interestingly enough, Table 3 provides evidence pointing 
out that a left-wing composition of regional governments (POL2) was overall 
less likely to increase health expenditure while when controlling for the 
coincidence of the same party in government (POL1), it shows the opposite 
effect. This coincidence of the same government determines an increase in 
expenditure rather than what could be expected if the mechanisms of a political 
agency were to take place. Although the coefficient of POLI2 might seem 
counterintuitive, similar results were found in Tavares (2004) for an aggregate 
dataset of several European countries.  
 
5.4 The effect of health inputs and  size  
 
In line with other studies (Guianoni and Hitris, 2002, Di Matteo and Di 
Matteo 2003), we find that availability of certain health inputs explains in 
conjunction with other determinants the expansion of the public health care 
sector at the regional level. However, as expected, health expenditure is 
determined by differences in health care inputs and their use. A 1% increase in 
the relative number of physicians’ concentration in a specific AC leads to an 
increase in 0.5% in per capita health care. On the other hand, a higher use of 
existing resources leads to a reduction of health care expenditure and number of 
stays.  Another remarkable finding indicates that although an unadjusted 
capitation mechanism is followed when allocating health care expenditures 
across ACs, a larger population leads to lower health care expenditure resulting 
from potential economies of scale in the provision of health care. However, 
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aging was never significant and is not displayed in Table 3. This result can be 
explained by the fact that the public financing system has not undertaken a risk 
adjustment for needs.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has explored the determinants of public health care 
expenditure of regions within the Spanish ‘system of regional health services’ 
(Lopez-Casasnovas et al, 2005). The Spanish example offers significant 
evidence of the potential effects resulting from spatial autocorrelation in public 
expenditure. These effects reject the null hypothesis of absence of spatial 
interactions and support the hypothesis that spatially autocorrelated residuals 
might provide some evidence of potential spatial interactions taking place 
through the mechanisms of the political agency. On the other hand, we have 
found evidence suggesting that the developments of political and fiscal 
decentralization in a context characterized by some inter-jurisdictional 
competition might increase public health expenditure.  As expected, those 
regions with fiscal in additional to political responsibilities in health care 
(namely the Basque Country and Navarre) expend the most, given that health 
care stands as the main priority (together with education) of Spanish citizens. On 
the other hand, on the basis of our findings, we have found that regardless of the 
specification, public health care expenditure is not a luxury good. Finally, the 
distribution of health care expenditure is not independent of partisan politics. 
Indeed, the ideology of the region-state and central state incumbent does have an 
influence on the expansion of the health care system. Accordingly, in the design 
of health care systems, decentralization might foster mechanisms leading 
towards the expansion of health care expenditure. However, political ideology 
might also influence how health expenditure is distributed within a specific 
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country and might have counter effects on other areas of public expenditure.  
However, this issue surpasses the scope of this paper.  
 
Overall, our results suggest that under NHS systems, other factors such as 
availability of inputs (e.g. number of beds and doctors) do play a role in 
determining public health care expenditure. The larger the number of inputs 
employed by one AC, the larger the health expenditure consistently with 
previous findings that a significant share of health expenditure in Spain is driven 
by volume of health care rather than prices (Lopez-Casasnovas et al, 2005). 
Furthermore, whether or not health care is a luxury good largely depends on the 
capacity of the NHS to reduce the economic and social barrier to access to 
health care.  
 
A potential limitation of our study lies in the fact that no evidence of 
private health expenditure is available at the regional level. Some studies 
indicate that the role of private health insurance (PHI) does play a role in 
supplementing public coverage, and it is found to be heterogeneously distributed 
across Spanish regions. Interestingly, PHI is found to normally exhibit 
elasticities above the one (Costa and Garcia, 2003). Altogether this evidence 
might suggest that rather than total health care, some share of health care 
expenditure might be a luxury good. Furthermore, at the aggregate level, private 
health expenditure has not significantly changed in the period examined and 
remains at 2.1% of GDP. Therefore, the expansion of the private sector might 
have expanded in certain ACs and declined in others.  
 
Policy implications can be drawn from our results, especially in the 
presence of a high demand for health care (health care ranking high in Spanish 
citizens) and a decentralization process enacting mechanisms for spatial 
dependence and inter-jurisdictional interactions. However, the nature of political 
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competition taking place in Spain indicates that regional and national 
incumbents have incentives to expand health care expenditure as a way to 
remain in power. Interestingly, since 2002 all 17 ACs have been empowered 
with health care responsibilities. Our results indicate that unless coordination 
mechanisms play a more active role, the development of the NHS is likely to be 
fostered. Potentially, one way to prevent the expansion of health care coverage 
has to do with the transfer of fiscal responsibilities to regions so that the 
mechanisms of vertical and horizontal competition take into account potential 
‘wickesellian connections’ (Breton, 1996), whereby constituents are able to 
compare current levels of health care coverage with levels of taxation.    
 24 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Anselin, L. and  Florax, R.J.G.M. (1995): New directions in Spatial 
Econometrics. Springer. Berlin. 
Anselin, L.; Florax, R.J.G.M. and Rey, S.J. (eds) (2004): Advances in Spatial 
Econometrics. Springer. Berlin. 
Aubin, C.; Berdot, J.P.; Goyeau, D. and Lafay, J.D. (1988): The growth of 
public expenditure in France. In Lybeck, J.A. and Henrekson, M. (eds), 
Explaining the growth of government. North-Holland. Amsterdam. 
Besley, T. and Case, A. (1995): Incumbent’s behavior: vote seeking, tax-setting 
and yardstick competition. American Economic Review, 85, 25-45. 
Blomquivst, A.G. and Carter R.A.L (1997): Is health care really a luxury good? 
Journal of Health Economics, 16, 207-229. 
Brenan, G. and Buchanan, J.M. (1983): Normative tax theory for a federal 
polity: Some public choice preliminarities. In McLure, C. (ed), Tax 
assignment in federal countries. Centre for Research on Federal Financial 
Relations. The Australian National University. Canberra. 
Breton, A. (1996): Competitive governments. An economic theory of politics and 
public finance. Cambridge University Press. London.  
Bueckner, J.K. (2000): Welfare reform and the race to the bottom: Theory and 
evidence. Southern Economic Journal, 66, 505-525. 
Cameron, D.R. (1978). The expansion of the public economy: A comparative 
analysis. American Political Science Review, 72, 124-1261. 
Case, A.; Hines, J. and Rosen, H. (1993): Budget spillovers and fiscal policy 
interdependence. Journal of Public Economics, 52, 285-307.  
Clemente, J.; Marcuiello, C.; Montañes, A. and Pueyo, F. (2004): On the 
international stability of health care expenditure functions: are 
government and private functions similar? Journal of Health Economics, 
23, 589-613. 
 25 
 
 
Costa-Font, J. and Rico, A. (2005): Vertical competition in the Spanish National 
Health System. Public Choice (forthcoming). 
Devlin, N. and Hansen, P. (2001): Health care spending and economic output: 
Granger causality. Applied Economics Letters, 8, 561-564. 
Di Matteo, L. and Di Matteo, R. (1998): Evidence on the determinants of 
Canadian provincial government health expenditure 1965-1991. Journal 
of Health Economics, 17, 211-228.  
Gerdtham, U.G. and Lothgren, M. (2003): On stationary and cointegration of 
international health expenditures and GNP. Journal of Health Economics, 
19, 461-475.  
Getzen, T. (2000): Health care is an individuals necessity and a national luxury: 
Applying multilevel decision models to the analysis of health care 
expenditure. Journal of Health Economics, 19, 259-270. 
Gianonni, M. and Hittris, T. (2002): The regional impact of health care 
expenditure: The case of Italy. Applied Economics, 34, 1829-1836 
Gordon, R. (1983): An optimal taxation approach to fiscal federalism. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 98, 567-588. 
Haan, J. and Sturm, J.E. (1994): Political and institutional determinants of fiscal 
policy in the European Community. Public Choice, 80, 157-172. 
Haan, J. and Sturm, J.E. (1997): Political and economic determinants of OECD 
budget  deficits and government expenditures: A reinvestigation. 
European Journal of Political Economy, 13, 739-750. 
Hansen, P. and King A. (1996): The determinants of health care expenditure: a 
cointegration approach. Journal of Health Economics, 15, 127-137. 
Henrekson, M. (1988): Swedish government growth: A disequilibrium analysis. 
In Lybeck, J.A. and Henrekson, M. (eds), Explaining the growth of 
government. North-Holland. Amsterdam. 
Hitris, T. and Nixon, J. (2001): Convergence of health care expenditures in the 
EU countries. Applied Economics Letters, 8, 223-228. 
 26 
 
 
Hitris, T. (1997): Health care expenditure and integration in the countries of the 
European Union. Applied Economics, 29, 1-6. 
Jewell, T.; Lee, J.; Tieslau, M. and Strazicich, M.C. (2003): Stationarity of 
health care expenditures and GDP: Evidence from panel data unit root 
tests with endogeneous structural breaks. Journal of Health Economics, 
22, 313-323.  
Kanavos, P. and Mossialos, E. (1999): International comparisons of health care 
expenditure:  What we know and what we do not know. Journal of Health 
Services Research Policy, 4, 122-126.  
Karatzas, G. (2000): On the determination of USA aggregate health care 
expenditures. Applied Economics, 32, 1085-1099. 
Lopez, G.; Costa-Font, J. and Planas, I. (2005): Diversity and regional 
inequalities: Assessing the outcomes of the Spanish system of health care 
services. Health Economics (forthcoming). 
Lybeck, J.A. (1988): Comparing government growth rates: The non-institutional 
vs. the institutional approach. In Lybeck, J.A. and Henrekson, M. (eds), 
Explaining the growth of government, North-Holland.Amsterdam. 
McCloskey, S.K and Selden, T.M. (1998):  Health care expenditure and GDP: 
Panel data unit root tests. Journal of Health Economics, 17, 369-376. 
Meltzer, A.H. and Richard, S.F. (1983): Tests of a rational theory of the size of 
government. Public Choice 41, 403-418. 
Newhouse, J.P. (1977): Medical care expenditure: A cross-national survey. 
Journal of Human Resources, 12, 115-125. 
Newhouse, J.P. (1992): Medical care costs: How much welfare loss? Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 6, 3-21.  
Okunade, A.A. and Murthy, V.N.R (2002): Technology as a major driver of 
health care costs: A cointegration analysis of the Newhouse conjecture. 
Journal of Health Economics, 21, 147-159. 
 27 
 
 
Parkin, D.; McGuire, A. and Yule, B. (1987): Aggregate health care 
expenditures and national income: us health care a luxury good? Journal 
of Health Economics, 6, 109-127.  
Pommerehne, W.W. (1990): The empirical relevance of comparative 
institutional analysis. European Economic Review, 34, 458-469. 
Revelli, F. (2001): Spatial patterns in local taxation: tax mimicking or error 
mimicking? Applied Economics, 33, 1101-1107. 
Revelli, F. (2002): Testing the tax mimicking versus expenditure spillover 
hypothesis using English data. Applied Economics, 14, 1723-1731. 
Rico, A. and Costa-Font, J. (2005): Power rather than path? The dynamics of 
health care federalism in Spain. Journal of Health Politics, Policy and 
Law (forthcoming). 
Roberts, J. (2000): Spurious regression problems in the determinants of health 
care expenditure: A comment on Hitris (1997). Applied Economics 
Letters, 7, 279-283. 
Roubini, N. and Sachs, J. (1989): Government spending and budget deficits in 
the industrial countries. Economic Policy, 8, 99-132. 
Sinn, H.W. (2003): The new systems competition. Blackwell. Oxford.  
Tavares, J. (2004): Does the right or left matter? Cabinets, credibility and 
adjustments. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2447-2468. 
Wittman, D. ( 1983): Candidate motivation: A synthesis of alternative theories. 
American Political Science Review, 77, 158-174. 
 
 
 28 
 
 
TABLES 
 
Table 1. Health expenditure and GDP of Spanish AC  
 Health expenditure per 
capita 
(Spain =100) 
GDP per 
capita 
(Spain =100) 
Population 
share 
(%) 
GDP share 
(%) 
Andalucía  99.8 72.9 18.0 13.3 
Aragón  103.9 108.3 3.0 3.3 
Asturias  106.5 82.8 2.7 2.5 
Baleares  83.7 131.1 1.9 2.2 
Canarias  93.9 100.0 4.0 3.7 
Cantabria  95.0 90.9 1.3 1.3 
Castilla-La 
Mancha  
104.1 83.9 4.3 3.6 
Castilla y León 91.2 95.9 6.4 6.0 
Cataluña  97.8 121.2 15.6 19.1 
C. Valenciana  101.6 101.0 10.1 9.6 
Extremadura  96.9 67.9 2.7 1.8 
Galicia  97.0 80.5 6.9 5.6 
Madrid  103.9 129.3 13.0 17.0 
Murcia  91.8 82.3 2.8 2.3 
Navarra  120.2 125.5 1.4 1.8 
País Vasco  112.9 114.4 5.3 6.3 
Rioja  96.8 116.5 0.7 0.8 
 100 100 100 100 
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Table 2.  Evolution of key health system variables (total Spain) ( mean and standard error below) 
 Per capita 
GDP (€) 
Per capita 
expenditure 
(€) 
Physicians 
/1000 h. 
Hospital stays 
s/pob. 
% pop. > 65 POLI1 POLI2 GDIR FORAL 
1992 9,474.1 465.5 3.98 1.23 16.7 Yes: 9 0.49 Yes: 7 Yes: 2 
 1,828.5 42.9 0.70 0.36 2.9 No: 8 0.12 No: 10 No: 15 
1993 9.715,7 498.4 4.02 1.20 16.9 Yes: 9 0.48 Yes: 7 Yes: 2 
 1,849,3 51.9 0.68 0.34 2.9 No: 8 0.13 No: 10 No: 15 
1994 10,274.7 498.9 4.08 1.19 17.1 Yes: 9 0.47 Yes: 7 Yes: 2 
 1,967.5 53.8 0.66 0.33 3.0 No: 8 0.13 No: 10 No: 15 
1995 10,976,8 544.3 4.09 1.23 17.2 Yes: 3 0.40 Yes: 7 Yes: 2 
 2,156.8 46.0 0.65 0.32 3.1 No: 14 0.11 No: 10 No: 15 
1996 11,571.9 582.0 4.21 1.25 17.2 Yes: 11 0.40 Yes: 7 Yes: 2 
 2,284.0 45.9 0.61 0.35 3.2 No: 6 0.11 No: 10 No: 15 
1997 12,227.2 601.8 4.28 1.26 17.4 Yes: 11 0.39 Yes: 7 Yes: 2 
 2,471.6 52.7 0.62 0.34 3.2 No: 6 0.11 No: 10 No: 15 
1998 12,932.1 640.2 4.36 1.27 17.5 Yes: 11 0.39 Yes: 7 Yes: 2 
 2,646.7 50.6 0.62 0.36 3.1 No: 6 0.12 No: 10 No: 15 
          
Mean 11,024.7 547.3 4.15 1.23 17.1 Yes: 63 0.43 Yes: 49 Yes: 14 
s.e 2,451.2 54.1 0.69 0.38 3.4 No: 56 0.12 No: 70 No: 105 
 
 
 
Table 3. The determinants of Health expenditure ( per capita) in Spain AC.  Estimation results (OLS and ML-SER) 
 [1] 
OLS 
[2] 
ML-
SER 
[3] 
OLS 
[4] 
ML-
SER 
[5] 
OLS 
[6] 
ML-
SER 
[7] 
OLS 
[8] 
ML-
SER 
[9] 
OLS 
[10] 
ML-
SER 
[11] 
OLS 
[12] 
ML-
SER 
[13] 
OLS 
[14] 
ML-
SER 
Ln (GDP per 
capita)  
0,987ª 
(0,000) 
0,976ª 
(0,000) 
0,714ª 
(0,000)
0,702ª 
(0,000)
0,677ª 
(0,000)
0,662ª 
(0,000)
0,752ª 
(0,000)
0,743ª 
(0,000) 
0,714ª 
(0,000)
0,702ª 
(0,000)
0,752ª 
(0,000)
0,716ª 
(0,000)
0,750ª 
(0,000)
0,714ª 
(0,000) 
Ln (population) -1,053ª 
(0,000) 
-1,012ª 
(0,000) 
-1,211ª 
(0,000)
-1,167ª 
(0,000)
-1,254ª 
(0,000)
-1,184ª 
(0,000)
-1,351ª 
(0,000)
-1,192ª 
(0,000) 
-1,211ª 
(0,000)
-1,197ª 
(0,000)
-1,351ª 
(0,000)
-1,204ª 
(0,000)
-1,354ª 
(0,000)
-1,210ª 
(0,000) 
Ln (Physistians/ 
population) 
  0,533ª 
(0,001)
0,542ª 
(0,004)
0,508ª 
(0,002)
0,512ª 
(0,006)
0,463b
(0,033)
0,481b
(0,029) 
0,533ª 
(0,001)
0,551ª 
(0,002)
0,463ª 
(0,003)
0,489ª 
(0,004)
0,465ª 
(0,003)
0,491ª 
(0,005) 
Ln 
(Stays/poplation)
  -0,004b
(0,020)
-0,006b
(0,034)
-0,006ª 
(0,003)
-0,006ª 
(0,004)
  -0,004b
(0,020)
-0,005b
(0,034)
    
POLI1     0,020b
(0,021)
0,018b
(0,019)
0,016b
(0,045)
0,015c
(0,064) 
  0,016b
(0,045)
0,018c
(0,059)
0,016b
(0,044)
0,018c
(0,055) 
POLI2       -0,338ª 
(0,001)
-0,317ª 
(0,001) 
  -0,338ª 
(0,001)
-0,316ª 
(0,002)
-0,337ª 
(0,001)
-0,319ª 
(0,003) 
GD  IR 4
AL 3
        17, 79ª 17,023ª
(0,000) (0,000)
19,507ª
(0,000)
18,783ª
(0,000)
  
FOR              21, 15ª 20,769ª 
(0,000) (0,000) 
λ   0,274ª 
(0,004) 
 0,281ª 
(0,007)
 0,294ª 
(0,008)
 0,291ª 
(0,003) 
 0,317ª 
(0,001)
 0,325ª 
(0,001)
 0,323ª 
(0,002) 
               
 
R2 adj. 0,998 (*) 0,998 (*) 0,999 (*) 0,999 (*) 0,998 (*) 0,999 (*) 0,999 (*) 
AIC-Akaike -3,588 -3,987 -3,689 -4,024 -3,728 -4,112 -3,752 -4,205 -3,690 -4,171 -3,753 -4,259 -3,712 -4,264 
I-Moran 3,137ª ---- 3,098ª ---- 3,127ª ---- 3,412ª ---- 3,392ª ---- 3,278ª ---- 3,280ª ---- 
LM-ERR 9,127ª ---- 9,766ª ---- 9,814ª ---- 10,146ª ---- 10,076ª ---- 10,237ª ---- 10,215ª ---- 
LM-LAG 1,267 1,198 1,342 1,129 1,323 1,204 1,419 1,219 1,317 1,285 1,328 1,191 1,311 1,184 
N 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 
Notes: Columns 1-14 report panel regressions with fixed effects 
p-values in parenthesis 
Null hypothesis rejected at significance level a?=0,01, b?=0,05 and c?=0,10 
OLS: Ordinary least squares 
LM-SER: Maximum likelihood estimation with spatial error autocorrelation 
λ : Spatial autocorrelation coefficient 
(*) The presence of spatial autocorrelation means the adjusted determination coeffient (R2 adj.) is inadequate for determining the goodness 
      of fit, and so, as is usual in the literature, we calculated Akaike’s infomation criterion (AIC) for each of the estimated models. 
 
